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A NEW APPROACH TO HOSPITAL IMMUNITY
Since 1954 hospitals have been subjected to substantial litigation
concerning the distribution and transfusion of blood that is infected
with the hepatitis virus.' Legal actions are complicated by the fact
that the presence of the virus in the blood cannot be prevented, nor
can the virus be detected in the donor's whole blood by any known
medical test; 2 thus any legal action in negligence is impractical and
the injured party must resort to a claim of implied warranty or strict
liability. Cases generally hold that this process is a service; 3 therefore
an implied warranty would not attach because no sale exists. However,
the New Jersey Superior Court has recently held in Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital4 that the distribution and transfusion of blood is a sale.
In Jackson the plaintiff received five transfusions of whole blood
during her hospitalization. Blood for four of the transfusions was
purchased from Eastern Blood Bank for $18 per container. Blood for
the fifth transfusion was obtained from Essex County Blood Bank, a
nonprofit organization. Soon thereafter, the plaintiff contracted hepatitis attributable to these transfusions. She brought this action against
the hospital and blood banks upon the claims of breach of implied
warranty and strict liability.
Jackson held that the distribution and transfusion of blood was a
sale. 5 The court apparently reasoned that since the serving of food
in a restaurant is a sale with respect to the implied warranty provision of the New Jersey Code,6 even though the service was predominate to the transfer of food, then the same rationale should be used for
'Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 1oo, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) was the

first case decided under the Uniform Sales Act to consider whether the transfusion
of blood in a hospital was a sale. See, e.g., 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 203, 205 n.8 (1965).
2See, Note, Liability For Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MINN. L. REV. 640,
654-5 (1958).
'See, Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 1o5 (D. Colo. 1946); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d
8o5 (1965); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 1oo, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954);
Goelz v. J. K. & Suzie L. Wadley Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12
Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1o85 (1961); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash.
2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d
324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964). But see Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d
749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd, 196 So. 2d 115 (1967).
'96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967). The court held that two
spales were involved: first between the blood bank and the patient; second between
the hospital and the patient.
1Id. at 883.
ON.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:2- 3 14 (l)

(1962).
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the transfusion of blood. However, the court did not imply a warranty
based upon this sale, because labels on the blood containers disclaimed
7
any warranty as to the presence of the hepatitus virus in the blood.
The disclaimer was held to be reasonable within § 2-V6 of the Code, s
thereby negating the application of the implied warranty sections. 9
The court then considered the possibility of imposing strict liability upon the defendants. The requirement for the imposition of strict
liability is that the product sold must be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user;1 0 the court concluded that this
product did not meet the requirement, since the virus cannot be detected by any known medical test.'1
Jackson's holding that the transfusion of blood is a sale is based
upon its rejection of the sales versus service test in the area of hospital
liability. 2 The distinction between contracts for sales and contracts
for services grew out of the Statute of Frauds requirement that contracts for the sale of goods be in writing.' 3 In determining whether
an act was a sale or a service, the courts developed several rules of
M"he labels on the blood containers carried disclaimers of liability, stating,
"'[d]espite the utmost care in the selection of donors, human blood may contain
the virus of Homologous Serum Hepatitis. Therefore Eastern Blood Bank does
not warrant against its presence in this blood.'" 232 A.2d at 882.
'See N.J. REv. STAT. § 12A:2- 3 16 (1962). The court stated that "[i]n view of
the undisputed fact that the presence of the virus cannot be detected and prevented, the disclaimer is clearly reasonable." 232 A.2d at 888.
0
N.J. Ray. STAT. §§ 12A:2- 3 14, 315 (1962) (implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness).
"See, RESTATENENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A, comment k at 353 (1965).
"A further problem presented by Jackson is an express warranty. Jackson
directed itself to the language of the disclaimer which stated that the "Blood
Bank employed 'the utmost care in the selection of donors.'" 232 A.2d at 888.
The court concluded that the disclaimer's language created an express warranty
that the Blood Bank did use "utmost care." Jackson then remanded this express
warranty action back to the trial court for jury determination on the factual
issue whether the Blood Bank had used "utmost care." If it had not, then the
Blood Bank would have breached this express warranty. See, N.J. REV. STAT. §
12A:2-313(1) (1962).
Jackson likewise remanded the action of negligence back to the trial court to
determine whether the Blood Bank had made some negligent act or omission.
Summary judgments were entered in favor of the two defendants on the
plaintiff's claim of implied warranty of merchantability and of strict liability.
'"Cases cited note 3 supra. One case has discussed this issue in relation to the
Uniform Commercial Code. Lovett v. Emory University, Inc., i6 Ga. App. 277,
156 S.E.2d 923 (1967). Lovett concluded that the tranfusion of blood is a service,
stating that this is the majority view under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Lovett is apparently incorrect because the majority view stated was decided under
the Sales Act, not the Code.
13 S. WsmmsrON, CONTRACTS § 505 (Jaeger 3 d ed. 196o).
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construction to aid them.' 4 Gradually these rules were adopted by
courts to distinguish between a sale or a service in other areas of the
law such as tax cases,' 5 cases involving the proper measure of dam7
ages, 16 warranty cases involving the transfer of title to machinery,
8
and food warranty cases.'

The sales versus service test was adopted for the first time in the
area of hospital liability in

Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,19

decided under the Uniform Sales Act. Subsequently, hospital liability
cases have based their decisions upon Perlmutter, thus making it the
landmark case for the proposition that the transfusion of blood is a
service. ° 0 In Perlmutter, the material facts are identical to Jackson
in that the plaintiff contracted hepatitis attributable to the transfusion

of blood during hospitalization. Perlmutter adopted the "essence"
test, one of the four rules of construction derived from the Statute of
Frauds, 2 ' to determine whether the transfusion of blood was a sale

of goods. Utilizing this rule, the court reasoned that the patient contracted for the hospital's services, not for the transfer of blood; there-

fore, the dominant nature of the contract was service, and no sale was
involved. This result eliminates any claim of breach of implied war22
ranty against the defendant hospital.
"Four distinct rules were formulated by courts to determine whether a sale
of goods had taken place. They are the English rule, essence test, Massachusetts
rule, and the New York rule. For a general discussion as to these rules of construction, see, Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 653, 663 (1957).
n5See Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 405 Ill. 367, 90
N.E.2d 747 (195o); Samper v. Department of State Revenue, 231 Ind. 26, io6
N.E.2d 797 (1952); Singing River Tire Shop v. Stone, 21 So. 2d 58o (Miss. 1945);
Booth v. City of New York, 268 App. Div. 502, 52 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1944); Voss v.
Gray, 70 N.D. 727, 298 N.W. 1 (1941).
"GSee, e.g., Rino v. Statewide Plumbing & Heating Co., 74 Idaho 374, 262 P.2d
1003 (1953).

"7See, e.g., United Iron Works v. Standard Brass Casting Co., 69 Cal. App. 384,
231 P. 567 (1924); Poole Eng'r & Mach. Co. v. Swindell, 161 Md. 571, 157 A. 763
(1932).

"8See, e.g., Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 A. 8o5 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
"93o8 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
2nCases cited note 3 supra.
2"Perlmutter adopted the "essence" test as formulated in Clay v. Yates, 156
Eng. Rep. 1123 (Ex. 1856). This test is based upon the distinction whether the
essence of a contract is the work or the materials supplied. See, e.g., Farnsworth,
Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUar. L. REV. 653 (1957).
?Perlmutter's adoption of the "essence" test is weakened by the fact that
apparently the decision was based upon pure policy considerations. The general
language of the decision indicates that the court was more concerned with protecting hospitals from liability for nonnegligent acts, than whether the sales-service
test was applicable in this area. See, Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d
749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). Russell recognized
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However, Jackson rejected the sales versus service test, in the area
of hospital liability, relying on § 2-314 of the Code.23 This section
states that "the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale." 24 The court stated that
it had been an apparent anachronism prior to this section, to attach
an implied warranty to food sold in a store, while not to attach an
implied warranty to food served in a restaurant. Because § 2-314
eliminates this anachronism by voiding the application of the salesservice distinction in the area of food warranty, the court concluded
25
that it should also be eliminated in the area of hospital liability.
It is apparent that the validity of Jackson's rejection of the sales
versus service test is dependent upon the viability of the analogy between food sold in a restaurant and blood transfusions in a hospital.
Assuming the analogy is permissible, the Code's rejection of the sales
versus service test in the area of food warranties calls for the same
result in the area of hospital liability.
In a similar situation, Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories26 lends
support to Jackson's analogy between food sold in restaurants and
the transfusion of blood in hospitals. In Gottsdanker, a child contracted polio attributable to an inoculation of Salk vaccine manufactured by the defendant laboratories. The court granted recovery
to the plaintiff, reasoning that because courts allow a consumer of a
food product to recover from a manufacturer upon an implied
warranty, the recipient of an inoculation should likewise receive
an implied warranty from the manufacturer of the vaccine. Gottsdanker's rationale appears to be equally applicable to the area of
hospital liability. The transfusion of blood and the serving of food
are both designed for introduction into the human body; thus there
exists a strong rational cohesion between the two factual situations.
This analogy is further supported by Gottsdanker's argument as to
the relative dangers between ingestion and injection of impurities into
the body.27 Impurities introduced into the circulatory system have
the legal disguises used to implement hospital immunity for nonnegligent acts
in Perlmutter and the cases which followed it.
2N.J. REv. STAT. § 12A:2- 3 14 (1962).
24d.
"Jackson concluded "fit is unthinkable that such a legalism should be revived
to avoid holding hospitals and blood banks liable. If these valuable organizations
are to be exempted from liability, the immunity should be based upon the true
policy consideration and not upon an irrelevant circumstance." 232 A.2d at 884.
"18 2 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 196o).
"Id.

at 323.

To further support this analogy, the court turned to the relative dangers between
ingestion and injection by reasoning: "The fact that the entry is made by injection
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much less chance of being rejected than do those introduced into the
digestive tract. Therefore, the policy for rejecting this sales-service
test in the area of food warranty by § 2-314 would be even more
applicable to the hepatitis cases where the chance of harm is much
greater. Thus, it appears that Jackson's analogy between the serving
2
of food and the transfusion of blood is permissible. 8
If the sales versus service test is invalidated in the area of hospital
liability, the transfusion of blood should be a sale within the provisions of the U.C.C. The Code defines 'goods' as "all things ... which
are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale ....-29 The blood used for the transfusion in Jackson falls within
this definition in that the specified blood was a moveable thing
identifiable at the making of the contract for sale. The Code also defines a sale as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price." 30 As mentioned in Jackson, the term "title passing" is not restrictive in terminology, and the character of the sale is the transfer of
property for value from one person to another without reference to
the manner of payment. 31 In Jackson the hospital transferred four
containers of blood to the patient for $25 apiece, which makes the
transaction a sale within the provisions of the Code.
In light of Jackson's decision as to the existence of a sale in the
transfusion of blood, it appears that the superior court was correct
upon two significant points. First, it would seem that the sales-service
rather than ingestion in no way alters the premise that each is for human consumption-each enters the human system. In fact, the digestive system has means
of rejecting or minimizing the effects of many toxic compounds taken orally. Such
defenses are much less available as against harmul elements introduced into the
system by hypodermic injection." 6 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
1This same analogy could have been used to reject Perlmutter's adoption of
the sales-service test in this area, even though § 2-314 had not been enacted at
that time. Prior to Perlmutter, Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635
(1924) had held that the serving of food in a restaurant was a sale, carrying with
it an implied warranty of wholesomeness. Perlmutter rejected any analogy to
Temple, rationalizing that one enters a restaurant solely for the purpose of purchasing food, while in entering a hospital, the dominant purpose is to obtain a
curative course of treatment. Perlmutter's reasoning is questionable upon two
grounds. First, the sole purpose for entering a restaurant is not to purchase
food, as in a grocery store, but also for the preparation and serving of the food.
Second, a basic analogy does seem to exist between food sold in restaurants and
the transfusion of blood in a hospital. See text accompanying note 27 supra for
Gottsdanker's support of this analogy. Apparently, Perlmutter could have substantiated this analogy; however, it appears that this would have been detrimental
to the court's immunization policy, and for this reason it was rejected. See note
22 supra.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(i).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-IO6(I).
3196 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879, 883 (Super. Ct. 1967).
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distinction should not be extended to the area of hospital liability.
Jackson's analogy to § 2-3-14, combined with Gottsdanker's comparison
of the likeness between ingestion and injection of impurities, appear
adequately to support the rejection of this distinction. Moreover, it
appears Perlmutter could have reached the same conclusion if the
New York court's purpose had not been to immunize hospitals from
nonnegligent acts. Second, in absence of this sales-service test, the
transfusion of blood is a sale within the provisions of both the Sales
Act 32 and the U.C.C.
Once a sale is formulated, § 2-314 of the U.C.C., 3 in the absence
of a disclaimer, appears to make the hospital and blood bank liable
for the patient's contraction of hepatitis. This implied warranty section states:
(i) Unless excluded.., a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect of goods of that kind.... (2) Goods
to be merchantable must be at least such as... (c) are fit for
the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used....84
As determined by Jackson, a contract of sale was present between the hospital and patient; therefore the warranty provisions
of this section would be applicable to this transaction. Jackson also
indicates that the determination of the blood bank's liability is governed by this section,3 5 even though no privity of contract was present
between the blood bank and patient. This proposition is validated by
reference to the U.C.C. provisions. Section 2-318 of the Code30 states
that Article II makes no decision as to whether an ultimate consumer
may hold a manufacturer liable under this article, despite the lack
of privity. Instead, this important question as to whether privity was
a necessary element in the warranty sections, would be left to the
"developing case law" in the different states. 37 Few states have abolish3it also appears that the transfusion of blood should be a sale within the
Uniform Sales Act. Perlmutter falls within the Sales Act's definition of a 'sale'
because the patient paid a specific price, $6o, for the blood, and there was an
agreement between the parties for the transfer of blood. See, UNIFORM SALES

Acr §

1(2).

"UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-314.

"Id.
'232 A.2d at 89o.
3UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE

§

2-318,

Comment 3. Also in some instances

this section limits the necessity of privity in the third party beneficiary of warranty
area. Thus, a member of the family or household or guest of the purchaser who
bought the goods may sue the retailer from whom the purchaser had contracted
a sale.
3The requirement of privity in warranties was originated at the time when
producers and purchasers dealt with one another at "arms length." Therefore,
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ed this privity requirement.3 s However, prior to Jackson, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Incorporated,39 that the ultimate consumer could sue the manufacturer despite the lack of privity.4 0 Since New Jersey had held that
privity was not an absolute requirement, Jackson was then permitted,
according to § 2-318, to hold that the Blood Bank was governed by
41
the warranty sections of the Code.
However, Jackson held that a warranty was not applicable in this
instance, because a written disclaimer was on the face of the blood
container.4 2 This disclaimer stated that the blood might be contaminated with the hepatitis virus even though "utmost care" had
been used in its prevention. Therefore, the blood bank declined to
warrant "against its presence in this blood." Jackson held that this
the privity doctrine was not harsh because this element was present between
the two parties. However, with the advent of industrialization, the manufacturers
became once or twice removed from the purchaser, and at this point, the privity
doctrine became harsh. It is for this reason, plus other social aspects, that tise
liberalizing trend has moved away from privity. This trend is necessary to form
a ddtente between the present mode of industry and the law of warranties. See,
Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.D.2d 828 (1942). See, e.g.,
Jaeger, Products Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
5o (1964).
8See, e.g., 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. lo (1966).
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (ig6o). The court held that "under modern marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of
trade... an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such
accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser." 161 A.2d at 84.
0Id. According to Henningsen, once the manufacturer enters into a sale
with the retailer, the warranty that arises from this sale will accompany the
goods once resold to the ultimate consumer. This situation is analogous to Jackson.
The Superior Court stated that a sale was present between the blood bank and
hospital therefore, the warranty in § 2-314, absent the disclaimer, attaches to
this sale, even though the hospital resold the blood to the patient.
41Two additional qualifications must be met by the blood bank and hospital
in order to support a claim of breach of implied warranty. First, it appears that
both defendants are merchants within § 2-314. This section requires that to be
a merchant a party must be a professional in the particular kind of goods sold,
to be a merchant. See, UNIFORM CONtMMFRCIAL CODE § 2-1o4, Comment 2. Obviously, both are merchants in that both parties "have specialized knowledge"
in the preparation and transfusion of blood. Both parties usually have the
laboratory facilities and testing equipment necessary to qualify them as experts
and professionals in this field. Second, the blood should not be merchantable
under § 2.-314(2)(c ) because the blood was contaminated with the hepatitis virus,
and therefore unfiit for the ordinary purpose of replenishing the patient's blood.
The implied warranty of fitness section, § 2-315, is also applicable to Jackson
in that the blood was being used for a particular purpose known by the hospital
and patient, that of transfusion into the human body.
42232 A.2d at 882.
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disclaimer would be valid if reasonable;4 3 concluding that "[i]n view
of the undisputed fact that the presence of the virus cannot be detected
44
and prevented, the disclaimer is clearly reasonable."
It is apparent that the validity of this disclaimer is subject to a
value judgment by the court, based upon public policy (i.e. what is
reasonable). It should be recognized, therefore, that through social
evolution, this policy as to immunizing hospitals for nonnegligent acts
might well change in the future.45 If it is decided that the hospitals
and blood banks that are insured with liability insurance are the
better parties to bear the cost of injury, then this disclaimer might
well become invalid.
At present, this disclaimer is valid, preventing the application of
the Code warranties; therefore strict liability is the only alternative
basis for defendants' liability.46 As mentioned in Jackson, if a product
is placed upon the open market in an unreasonably dangerous condition, 47 then the defendants should be held strictly liable. Jackson
held that the defective condition of the contaminated blood was not
unreasonably dangerous because the virus cannot be detected by any
known medical test. Therefore, the fact that the contamination was
not the result of a negligent act, combined with the public utility of
blood transfusions, makes the defective condition reasonable. Thus,
48
strict liability does not apply.
In conclusion, Jackson has correctly held that the transfusion of
blood is a sale by rejecting the application of the sales-service test.
"3Jackson cited N.J. REv. STAT. § 12A:2-316 (1962) which states that a disclaimer is valid if reasonable. This section encompasses the modification of warranties also.
"232 A.2d at 888.

4In Henningsen, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the manufacturer's
attempt to disclaim an implied warranty was unreasonable, and thus was void.
Therefore, in the future, the policy in the hepatitis cases might move closer to
that of Henningsen. This would result in the invalidation of disclaimers as in
Jackson. For a general discussion as to disclaimers, see, e.g., Note, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 318 (1968).
46Jackson attempted to consolidate nonsale warranties into strict liability. The
sole justification of this consolidation would be that both are based upon the
same cause of action. Since strict liability is based upon the law of torts, this
nonsale warranty must also be based upon tort law to constitute the same cause
of action. See, e.g., REsTATAmENT (SECOND)

or TORTS, §

4 02A,

comment m at 355

(1965). In those jurisdictions that have not negated privity in the Code warranties,
the nonsale warranty arises when a manufacturer is held to have impliedly
guaranteed the quality of his product to the ultimate consumer. No sale or privity
of contract exists between the two parties, therefore this implied warranty would
be based upon tort law and constitute the same cause of action as strict liability.
Therefore, Jackson's consolidation theory would be valid.
47REsTATEMfENT (SECOND) or TORTS, § 402A, comment m at 355 (1965).
"sSee, REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 oA, comment k at 353 (1965).

